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Abstract 
Social philosophers often invoke the concept of  false consciousness in their analyses, 
referring to a set of  evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound 
epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to 
perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in 
questions of  responsibility for the harm suffered by members of  oppressed groups is 
victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the 
relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of  reasoning or 
knowledge practices, undermining their status as responsible moral agents. 
 But attending to the constitutive mechanisms and heterogeneity of  false 
consciousness allows us to see how having it does not eo ipso render someone an 
inappropriate target of  blame. I focus here on the 1889 anti-suffragist manifesto “An 
Appeal Against Female Suffrage,” arguing that its signatories, despite false consciousness, 
satisfy both conditions for ordinary blameworthiness. I consider three prominent 
signatories, observing that the irrationality characterisation is unsustainable beyond 
group-level diagnoses, and that their capacity to respond appropriately to reasons was 
not compromised. Following recent work on epistemic injustice, I also argue that 
culpable mechanisms constituted their false consciousness, rendering them blameworthy 
for the Appeal. 
Social philosophers and theorists often analyze occasions of  ‘voluntary victimhood’ in terms of  
false (or ideological) consciousness, referring to a set of  evidence-resistant ignorant attitudes held by 
otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to 
perpetuate, structural oppression.1 But there is an intuitive worry in general that appealing to the 
notion of  false consciousness in questions of  responsibility for the harm suffered by members 
of  oppressed groups amounts to victim-blaming by conceptual fiat (see, e.g., Superson 1993, 
Cudd 2006, Hay 2013).2 That is, where victim-blaming is understood to refer to blaming 
practices that focus attention inappropriately on victims in accounting for the relevant harms 
(Harvey 1999; cf. Matthews 2014).3 This is because simply using the concept of  false 
consciousness to characterize oppressed agents would, allegedly, not only detract attention from 
underlying unjust structural conditions but also unduly assume an otherwise absent or 
diminished moral agency. And this has contributed to the concept’s exile from social philosophy 
and theory in both ‘analytic’ and ‘Continental’ circles (see Jaeggi 2009, 82n17).4 Considerations 
of  how to theorize about the false consciousness of  the oppressed have always avoided the 
question of  moral blameworthiness with some unease (see, e.g., Shelby 2007). The assumption 
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behind the ‘victim-blaming’ intuition, put in Strawsonian terms, is that an individual under false 
consciousness systematically fails to meet the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to 
structural distortions of  reasoning or knowledge practices: such that their status as a responsible 
moral agent is thereby undermined. 
 A paradigmatic case of  false consciousness can be found in fin-de-siècle Britain, when a 
hundred and four prominent women put forward the anti-suffragist manifesto “An Appeal 
Against Female Suffrage.” Published in 1889, the Appeal marked a watershed, women-led 
response to the purported threat of  suffragism at the time—an act that, as some suffragists 
wryly noted, ran counter to not only to the growing need to represent women’s interests in 
legislation but also the very anti-participatory sentiments that the anti-suffragists professed to 
uphold. There is a general consensus among historians that the Appeal did not simply express 
the widespread social conservatism of  the time but contributed significantly to maintaining this 
status quo of  the parliamentary exclusion of  women until their eventual enfranchisement after 
the First World War (and the profound shifts that it brought to the British workforce). 
 However, in this case, one might also have the conflicting intuition that it is precisely 
because of  false consciousness, and its attendant epistemic sophistication and lack of  coercion, 
that allows one to legitimately lay part of  the blame on such agents. There is a sense that the 
concept brings to focus crucial but otherwise overlooked agents that are partly responsible for 
contributing to anti-suffragism. And, as recent historians have noted, narratives that the women 
of  the Appeal were simply uncritical handmaiden in the anti-suffrage cause of  men crucially 
overlooks the unique and thoughtful contribution of  the signatories in strategizing and 
succeeding in “inflecting anti-suffragism with new, more positive emphases designed especially to 
appeal to female public opinion” in both parliamentary and public debates (Bush 2007, 157; see 
also Nelson 2004, Delap 2005). The concept of  false consciousness provides a constitutive story 
about how they became a particular type of  agent such that we would justifiably attribute the 
relevant act to them as theirs. False consciousness would thus allow us to see the women anti-
suffragists as having the same status of  agency as their male counterparts (who were themselves 
largely under the grips of  patriarchal ideology), as equally full-fledged members of  the moral 
community. Exempting them as moral agents in limine would not only be unjustly presumptive 
(the anti-suffragists themselves only expressed opposition to political equality) but also be 
counter-productive to the emancipatory cause.5 Ordinarily, our blaming practices are thought to 
have a crucial communicative function, addressing agents and appealing to shared reasons for 
modifying their attitudes or behavior (see, e.g., Calhoun 1989, Houston 1992, Moody-Adams 
1994, Fricker 2016a, Mason 2019). In contrast, by theorizing such agents outside the moral 
community, we preclude ourselves from enlisting them in collective resistance against a shared 
oppression and to bring about structural change (cf. Shelby 2007, Jugov and Ypi 2019).6 
 So while the intuition of  exemption from blameworthiness has been often presumed, I 
wish to cautiously vindicate the second intuition and allay the worry of  victim-blaming. I argue 
that attending to the constitutive mechanisms and heterogeneity of  false consciousness allows us 
to better see how suffering from it does not eo ipso render an agent an inappropriate target of  
blame—that is, how one’s status as a morally responsible agent is not necessarily undermined by a 
characterisation of  false consciousness. To do this, I take up the women of  the Appeal as a 
historical case study to show how they, even under false consciousness, can satisfy both the 
rationality and epistemic conditions and thereby qualify for blameworthiness in the ordinary 
sense.7 My main contention here is that too often the broad group-level strokes in painting false 
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consciousness as such as irrational, along with focusing on whether a whole category of  people 
can be relevantly aware under situations of  oppression, pays insufficient attention to the variety 
in how the relevant ignorance at the individual level might be nevertheless actively acquired and 
maintained by the agent as part of  their false consciousness. 
 Important historical work has been done to show how arduous, complex, and often 
disharmonious it was for women anti-suffragists at the time to formulate and publicise their 
opposition to the suffrage campaign over the decades (as it also was for the suffragists). As such 
historians have cautioned, our various understandings of  the feminist/anti-feminist distinction 
today do not easily map onto the suffragist/anti-suffragist distinction, not least because the term 
‘feminism’ was inconsistently deployed and could also be applicable to many anti-suffragists. 
Indeed, a significant number of  anti-suffragists did not see their opposition to suffrage as a 
maintenance of  a patriarchal status quo, but rather as directing women’s progress out of  the 
household towards more appropriate social, yet non-political, roles befitting of  their gender, e.g. 
education and healthcare (see, e.g., Delap 2005, Heilmann and Sanders 2006, Crozier-De Rosa 
2018).8 My approach here is not inconsistent with these important observations, which deserve 
careful attention in their own right, but my interests are nonetheless primarily philosophical. I 
attend to the circumstances surrounding the Appeal and any subsequent development only to 
the extent that they elucidate the rationality and epistemic conditions of  blameworthiness in 
undersigning the Appeal. The narrow focus here on whether we may correctly judge particular 
signatories as blameworthy for the 1889 Appeal, is thus distinct from the broader and far more 
complex question about how we should judge them (or women anti-suffragists in general) for 
hindering or promoting women’s interests on the whole—not to mention questions about what 
would be achieved by blaming them or whether we have the standing to blame them today. 
 In what follows then, I will first give a sketch of  the general concept of  false 
consciousness and its constitutive mechanisms, showing how the two diverging intuitions about 
the culpability of  oppressed agents arise (§1). I will then attend specifically to the case of  the 
Appeal, observing how its signatories, despite false consciousness, satisfy both rationality and 
epistemic conditions for ordinary blameworthiness (§2).9 I focus on the details of  three 
prominent women of  the Appeal—Louise Creighton, Beatrice Webb, and Mary (Humphry) 
Ward—arguing that the irrationality characterisation is unsustainable beyond the group-level 
diagnosis, and that the women of  the Appeal’s capacity to respond appropriately to reasons was 
demonstrably not compromised despite them being correctly understood as having false 
consciousness. Then, drawing on recent work on epistemic injustice and attending to the 
women’s own writings, I argue that there were indeed culpable mechanisms at play in the case of  
their false consciousness—e.g. testimonial injustice and wilful hermeneutic ignorance—rendering 
them blameworthy for the Appeal. Lastly, I return to what the case study means for the 
relationship between the concept of  false consciousness and blameworthiness in general, 
particularly in terms of  how such careful historical attention helps refine and delimit our use of  
the concept as social philosophers or theorists (§3). 
1. False Consciousness 
False or ideological consciousness is often characterized as a set of  attitudes that are epistemically, 
functionally, and genetically ‘false’ (Geuss 1981, Meyerson 1991, Shelby 2003). That is, it is a set of  
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evidence-resistant ignorant beliefs, that constitute the motivating, and/or (putatively) normative, 
reasons for an individual to act in ways that maintain a structure of  oppression, and that 
systematically form in virtue of  a given structure of  oppression.10 As a critical concept employed 
by social philosophers and theorists, false consciousness not only allows us to attend to 
otherwise neglected oppressive aspects of  (i.e. ‘problematize’) a given social structure that might 
have initially appeared benign, but, in doing so, orients us towards the possibility of  amelioration 
(see Haslanger 2005, Celikates 2017). It is thus to be understood as the individual, as opposed to 
structural, side of  the same coin as the concept of  ideology (see Jaeggi 2009). While the latter 
concerns the schematisation of  resources and agents at the collective level, false consciousness 
concerns the attitudes of  agents at the individual level under these schemas, inasmuch as they 
occupy a particular node. But its individual-level (or nodal-level) analysis cannot be entirely 
divorced from the structural. Analysing false consciousness concerns not just how oppressed 
individuals themselves come to systematically form and maintain certain ignorant beliefs as 
(putatively) true and normative, given their position within relevant structures, but, further, how beliefs 
of  such content are themselves formed and maintained in these structures. Such analyses would 
also have to involve how individuals might nevertheless resist the formation or maintenance of  
such beliefs (sometimes systematically)—i.e. the possibility of  emancipatory consciousness. 
 Broadly speaking, most social philosophers and theorists hold that false consciousness 
involves an individual (belonging either to oppressor or oppressed groups) mistaking a certain 
socially objectified understanding of  themselves as natural self-understanding (or another 
functionally similar, authoritative and immutable domain e.g. divine), due to the historical 
stabilisation of  shared pre-existing structures of  oppression (see, e.g., Cudd 2006). This involves 
stabilizing mechanisms (sometimes called ‘distortion mechanisms’) that occur systematically at 
both individual and structural levels, resulting in a looping effect in an individual’s self-
understanding given their position in the relevant structure (Haslanger 2011). This looping 
effect, crucially, involves more than the classification and the classified people.11 That is, there are 
also feedback loops among institutions, knowledge, and experts (Hacking 2006). At the individual 
level, then, this includes: Nash equilibria, stereotype threat/boost, implicit bias, cognitive failure, 
preference adaptation, wishful thinking, speech act accommodation, epistemic vice (e.g. 
arrogance, laziness), and first-order epistemic exclusions (e.g. testimonial injustice). At the 
structural level: market equilibria, culture industry, consumer production, and second- and third-
order epistemic exclusions (e.g. hermeneutical injustice or contributory injustice).12 
 Notably, a given form of  false consciousness is indexed to the domain of  its social 
structure. That is, the content of  the relevant ignorant beliefs are circumscribed by the limits of  
the schemas and the resources constituting the structure (e.g. a form of  false consciousness 
pertaining to European cisheterosexuality in 19th century Britain would not involve beliefs with 
content concerning the stellar wind pressure experienced by Proxima Centauri b). And because 
different social structures can schematize over the same resources and agents (e.g. in overlapping 
cases of  oppression), false consciousness can either be compounded or eroded. In 
compounding, schemas combine such that the set of  ignorant beliefs can gain not only content 
but further stabilizing mechanisms that reinforce evidence-resistance. In erosion, it could ex 
hypothesi happen in at least two ways: epistemic friction and radical marginalisation. Epistemic 
friction occurs when incompatible schemas and stabilizing mechanisms run up against each 
other and the resultant discordance conduce the possibility of  what José Medina calls “meta-
lucidity,” which “provides insights in to the functioning of  perspectives that makes it possible to 
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redraw [one’s] cognitive maps, to redescribe [one’s] experiences, and to reconceptualize [one’s] 
ways of  relating to others” (Medina 2013, 47). In radical marginalisation, according to classical 
Marxism, an agent (or group of  them) is so excluded from social practices that stabilizing 
mechanisms do not have any grip and there is no feedback loop conducing the internalisation of  
socially objectified self-understanding.13 But, again, both these erosions render emancipatory 
consciousness only possible and cannot guarantee actualisation—unfortunately, it is perhaps just as 
common, if  not more so, that false consciousness is reinforced by epistemic friction (see Nyhan 
and Reifler 2010). 
 Given this analytical framework for false consciousness then, we can now account for 
how the diverging intuitions of  exculpation and culpability arise, considering the diverse 
mechanisms and different aspects of  the heterogeneity of  false consciousness.14 An oppressed 
individual’s agency and reasons is conceptualized as both constrained and constituted within a 
structure of  oppression, and when the individual-level mechanisms salient for the constitution 
are culpable, we would regard the agent as blameworthy for the issuing action. This does not 
mean, however, that false consciousness is, or should be, completely reducible to its constituent 
mechanisms.15 The concept not only plays a crucial regulative role in guiding research in social 
philosophy within critical projects, emphasizing systematic coordinations of  the constituent 
mechanisms, but adequate normative and epistemological assessments of  false consciousness 
can only be found at the structural level, as ideology critique (Celikates 2017). The mechanisms 
alone do not guarantee that the beliefs would be ignorant to the extent that they systematically 
motivate acts of  oppression. Explanations appealing to false consciousness are thus ‘structural 
explanations’ as Sally Haslanger understands them—that is, they help us understand “the 
behavior of  the individual given their place in a structure” and also understand “the individual as 
the instance of  a type—a type defined by the conditions for existing at that node” (Haslanger 
2016). 
 So the ethical task here of  determining whether a specific agent is nonetheless morally 
responsible would mainly involve the individual-level analysis of  the form of  false consciousness, 
attending to the constitutive stabilizing mechanisms salient for the agent, given their position 
within the relevant structure(s), and the structural-level only insofar as it might restrict or mask 
rationality, or render ignorance non-culpable.16 
2. The Case of  the Women Anti-Suffragists 
Before I get to my main argument, it is worth summarizing the argument of  the Appeal. It was 
published in June 1889 in the Nineteenth Century, a mainstream periodical that published debates 
of  leading intellectuals at the time, with a number of  unspecified signatories who were largely 
upper-class women. The Appeal’s rejection of  suffragism was grounded in the belief  that “the 
limits fixed by the physical constitution of  women, and by the fundamental difference which 
must always exist between their main occupations and those of  men” made it such that “the 
necessary and normal experience of  women […] does not and can never provide them with such 
materials for sound judgment as are open to men,” with respect to parliamentary concerns (“An 
Appeal Against Female Suffrage”). Effectively, the Appeal argued that women already influence 
politics in an indirect way that would ensure that their different interests and capacities are 
accorded due weightage in parliamentary decision-making: suffrage was thus unnecessary and 
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counter-productive. What undergirded this was a self-understanding of  women of  the Appeal as 
being naturally different in a way that excluded them from the political sphere. According to the 
Appeal, women’s suffrage was both unnecessary and antithetical to their own proper domain of  
activity, in that direct participation would lead to epistemic and ethical weightlifting (cf. Williams 
1995). According to the Appeal, while men were political animals, women were domestic ones. 
 From this, it is clear how it would be appropriate for us to apply the concept of  false 
consciousness to the women of  the Appeal: their belief  that women were naturally deficient in 
political judgment is patently false (epistemic falsity), arising out of  the social conservatism of  
the time (genetic falsity), and it motivated them to undersign a manifesto that buttressed the anti-
suffragist movement (functional falsity). But despite satisfying the analytic conditions of  the 
concept, I will now go on to show that historical attention to the women of  the Appeal’s 
position in fin-de-siècle Britain reveals that the stabilizing mechanisms involved do not undermine 
their status as morally responsible agents. That is, they would still be blameworthy insofar as the 
mechanisms do not undermine the rationality and epistemic conditions. 
 2.1. The Rationality Condition 
As mentioned at the outset, the concept of  false consciousness has often been taken to imply an 
exempting irrationality on the part of  the affected agent. Carol Hay, for example, argues that 
oppression may damage one’s rational capacities permanently and thus disqualify them as a 
blameworthy agent, citing false consciousness (she calls it ‘self-deception’) as a “classic” case of  
such resultant irrationality, wherein “oppressive social systems create incentives for oppressed 
people to believe certain falsehoods about themselves, contrary to their own evidence” (Hay 
2013, 123–124; cf. Superson 1993). It would thus be tempting to think that the women of  the 
Appeal, under conditions of  patriarchy, suffered from some sort of  collective motivated 
irrationality, inasmuch as this suggested an inability to respond to reasons to the extent that they 
would compromise their own interests. After all, the Appeal’s success in maintaining the status 
quo of  the parliamentary exclusion of  women was not only in its novel, women-friendly 
packaging of  anti-suffragism, but, as suffragist Ray Strachey solemnly recorded in 1928, it 
“presented [a new argument] to the [anti-suffragist] side. ‘Women themselves don’t want the 
vote,’ they could now say; unfortunately it was partly true” (Strachey 1978, 285). 
 But this ‘top-down’ approach is mereologically suspect: it considers the social-level 
properties of  the women of  the Appeal as being instantiated at the individual-level simply in 
virtue of  them being in the group. While the claim of  systematic irrationality might be 
maintained at the level of  the signatories as a collective, it is harder to maintain at the individual 
level of  analysis, when we attend to the various mechanisms that formed and maintained the 
belief  in natural incapacity of  women for political activity. 
 As mentioned at the outset, and despite the relative dearth of  historical attention on 
them compared to suffragists, anti-suffragism was neither a fringe nor homogeneous stance 
among women at the time. While suffragists such as Millicent Fawcett and Margaret Dilke swiftly 
and acerbically responded in the July issues of  the Nineteenth Century and Fortnightly Review, with 
hundreds undersigned, thousands more signatures came in the August issue of  the Nineteenth 
Century in support of  the Appeal. The political equality of  women was far from clear as a settled 
moral fact for the zeitgeist and there were internal disagreements even among those who later 
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organised themselves as the Women’s National Anti-Suffrage League (1908–1910). Further, 
much anti-suffragists’ sentiments was left unexpressed in the public sphere, not only partly as a 
“logical extension of  their reluctance to take to the stage of  parliamentary politics” but also 
because of  “their positive commitment to a paradigm of  womanhood characterized by altruistic 
femininity, devotion to family duties, and inconspicuous public service in the extended domestic 
setting of  local communities,” (Bush 2007, 3; see also Heilmann and Sanders 2006, Crozier-De 
Rosa 2018). 
 As with all forms of  false consciousness, the content of  the ignorant beliefs of  the 
women of  the Appeal were noticeably bound to the domain of  its domestic social structures 
(although this was only slowly being extended by the influx of  women into the labor market). 
These women were perfectly capable of  responding to relevant reasons in other aspects of  social 
life and were well-respected in doing so: Beatrice Webb was a leading sociologist of  the 
cooperative movement and a co-founder of  the London School of  Economics; Mary Ward was 
an accomplished novelist who was a prominent advocate for the education of  the poor as a 
means for ‘equalisation’ in society; Louise Creighton was the co-founder and first president of  
the bipartisan National Union of  Women Workers (NUWW), which coordinated women 
volunteers throughout Britain. 
 One might thus instead follow Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill in adopting a ‘bottom-
up’ mechanical approach to the question of  irrationality, guided by a notion of  false 
consciousness (see, e.g., Cudd 2006). In “Enfranchisement of  Women,” the central question for 
Taylor and Mill was “why the existence of  one-half  the species should be merely ancillary to that 
of  the other—why each woman should be a mere appendage to a man, allowed to have no 
interests of  her own, that there may be nothing to compete in her mind with his interests and his 
pleasure” (Taylor and Mill 1851, 12). They observed that women have been made to “consider as 
their appropriate virtues” their (at minimum) political dependence on men (ibid., 13). Later, in 
The Subjection of  Women (1869), Mill noted that 
All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief  that their ideal of  
character is the very opposite to that of  men; not self-will, and government by self-
control, but submission, and yielding to the control of  others. All the moralities tell them 
that it is the duty of  women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to 
live for others; to make complete abnegation of  themselves, and to have no life but in 
their affections. And by their affections are meant the only ones they are allowed to have
—those to the men with whom they are connected, or to the children who constitute an 
additional and indefeasible tie between them and a man. (Mill 1995, 132–133) 
 But while it might well have been the case that global autonomy was compromised in the 
declaration of  the Appeal (i.e. the women’s ability to determine their own ends across the span 
of  their lives), it is less clear that local autonomy is at all compromised for the women of  the 
Appeal (i.e. their capacity to respond appropriately to reasons for the execution of  individual 
acts) since questions about whether one should have, say, potatoes and molasses for supper 
would not fall under the purview of  the relevant form of  false consciousness here (McKenna 
2005, Oshana 2005). And although some might argue that one’s capacity to respond 
appropriately to reasons may be suitably compromised in under oppression, these arguments 
have largely been concerned with cases where preference adaptation occurs—that is, when an 
individual adjusts preferences in light of  their frustration (see, e.g., Hay 2013, Cudd 2015). It is 
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unclear, however, how the mechanism of  preference adaptation would be very salient for the 
women of  the Appeal in their position, given that they were upper and middle class women 
(none of  them were working class). Webb, for example, admits herself  that “had [she] been a 
man, self-respect, family pressure and the public opinion of  [her] class would have pushed [her] 
into a money-making profession; as a mere woman, [she] could carve out a career of  
disinterested research” (Webb 1929, 355). While these women might have been politically 
excluded, they were by no means frustrated to the extent that their responsiveness to reasons 
would be compromised and they nevertheless did have overlapping social concerns with 
suffragists as was seen in the NUWW (and also in their friendships across partisan lines).17 
 Moreover, it is hard to maintain that the women’s local autonomy were so compromised 
to warrant exculpation, given what we know about the degree of  sophistication and strategizing 
that went into publishing the manifesto. The Appeal was primarily a result of  the efforts of  co-
instigators Ward and Creighton. Creighton herself  had expressed, and was compelled by, fears 
that the increased frequency of  franchise attempts in the House of  Commons and a sympathetic 
Prime Minister “[made] it seem likely that Parliament might suddenly pass a bill granting female 
suffrage” (Louise Creighton to Ida Koch, May 23, 1889). It would not come as a surprise that the 
editor of  the Nineteenth Century, James Knowles, was a known anti-suffragist and saw Ward and 
Creighton’s enthusiasm as a welcome means for his periodical to intervene in the ongoing 
suffragism debates at such a critical juncture (Bush 2007, 144). But the production and 
publication of  the manifesto was an affair of  joint decision-making rather than one of  Knowles’ 
sole orchestration. Amongst themselves, moreover, Ward and Creighton were also self-
consciously attempting to distance themselves from the “semi-religious beliefs on the natural and 
necessary position of  women” held by their male counterparts, which they did not “altogether 
share” (Mary Ward to Louise Creighton, April 18, 1889). 
 From these considerations, then, we can safely conclude that the capacity to respond to 
relevant reasons were neither restricted nor masked in any absolute or exemptive way. After all, 
false consciousness cannot be exemptive simpliciter if  we are not willing to also exempt 
oppressors who suffer it by the same token—there is surely an absurdity in excluding a good 
portion of  the population in limine as morally responsible agents. So while irrationality might 
actually be the right diagnosis for other forms of  false consciousness elsewhere (e.g. those 
involving preference adaptation), the false consciousness of  the women of  the Appeal would be 
better characterized as a matter of  having bad premises. That is, the more fruitful approach is 
not whether they had the capacity to adequately weigh up what was right or wrong in their act of  
undersigning, but whether they had the awareness of  what was right and wrong to begin with. 
 2.2. The Epistemic Condition 
It is not uncommon for agents affected by false consciousness to be regarded as exempt from 
blameworthiness on account of  failing to satisfy the epistemic condition. Ann Cudd, for 
example, thinks that false consciousness renders an agent non-culpably ignorant, noting that “the 
oppressed may well not understand the oppression they suffer, for it is often a part of  their 
oppression that it is hidden from them under the guises of  tradition or divine command or the 
natural order of  things” (Cudd 2006, 198). It is thus also tempting to compare the women of  the 
Appeal with the usual examples found in discussions on culpable ignorance, such as ancient 
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slaveholders or sexist U. S. fathers in the 1950s (see, e.g., Benson 2001, G. Rosen 2003, Guerrero 
2007, Sher 2017). Much of  the debate surrounding these examples concern whether the 
circumstantial epistemic bad luck that these agents find themselves in is sufficient to exculpate, 
given that, e.g.,“it would have taken a moral genius to see through to the wrongness of  chattel 
slavery” (G. Rosen 2003, 66; cf. Fricker 2007, 98–107). But there are at least two disanalogies 
here, at individual and structural levels of  analyses. 
 At the individual level, the usual comparisons are almost always cases wherein the agents 
under analysis are clearly members of  the oppressing group—e.g. the “run-of-the-mill” First 
World, cishet, white, middle-class man in Gideon Rosen’s classic case (ibid.)—and not the 
oppressed: they would not be victims but paradigmatic beneficiaries of  epistemic injustice. 
Perhaps supporting weaker intuitions to exculpate in these cases, the relevant forms of  false 
consciousnesses and corollary stabilizing mechanisms in these would be substantially different 
from those cases pertaining to members of  oppressed groups (e.g. stereotype boost vs stereotype 
threat). 
 At the structural level, the applicability of  the concept of  false consciousness to the 
women anti-suffragists itself  distinguishes this case from these comparisons: where a lack of  
epistemic friction often thought to characterize cases such as ancient slaveholders, evidence 
resistance in the case of  the anti-suffragists presupposes encounter with dissenting views. In this 
case, it was clear that there was ample counter-evidence: longstanding suffragist arguments (the 
centenary of  Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of  the Rights of  Women was just around the corner) 
and recent shifts in the labor market.18 Importantly, the latter meant being faced with the conflict 
between the social consciousnesses arising out of  membership in Victorian society as a politically 
dependant and that out of  membership in the labor market as an economically independent—
both of  which schematized the same resources. As Dilke replied to the Appeal, 
The supporters of  woman suffrage do not believe in indirect representation under any 
circumstances, but least of  all when the influx of  women into the labour market brings 
them, whether they will it or no, into competition with those whose interests and 
capacities are different; it is not the Woman Suffrage Societies that have brought about 
this great social change. A man is no longer expected, even in well-to-do middle-class 
society, to support his adult sisters and daughters as well as his wife and infant children. 
The societies, accepting the new state of  things, wish to protect the earning of  these 
women, to teach them self-reliance, to help them in the only way human beings can be 
efficiently helped—shown how to help themselves. 
 […] The rapidly increasing wealth of  the middle classes has deprived thousands of  
women of  the necessity for household toil; but education and increased opportunities 
for intellectual and public work draw these same women, if  not in the first, then in the 
second generation, into busy useful lives, giving satisfaction to themselves and benefit to 
the community at large. (Dilke 1889) 
We see concrete demonstrations of  such epistemic friction giving rise to emancipatory 
consciousness in the public defections of  Webb and Creighton to, and in their vocal support for, 
the suffragist cause between the Appeal’s publication and the formation of  the Women’s 
National Anti-Suffrage League. In 1906, Creighton announced to the NUWW that she realized 
that, given the increasing role women were playing in party politics, they needed to have “the 
responsibility of  the vote” (Creighton 1994, 89, 146).19 A few days after, Webb wrote a public 
letter to Fawcett explaining that she now realized that there was a need “to permit this growing 
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consciousness among women—that their particular social obligations compel them to claim a 
share in the conduct of  political affairs” by “finding a constitutional channel” (Beatrice Webb to 
Millicent Fawcett, November 2, 1906). On the contrary, the suffragist responses only served to 
reinforce Ward’s anti-suffragist position, and she intensified her efforts against suffragism in the 
following years. 
 The question concerning us, therefore, is whether there were stabilizing mechanisms 
specific to the women of  the Appeal—which were disrupted for Creighton and Webb, or 
reinforced for Ward—were ones that would have made them culpable for their ignorance, such 
that judgments that they were blameworthy for undersigning are justified. And from the 
suffragists’ indignant replies, we can gather an affirmative answer: testimonial injustice and wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance. That is, caused by the prejudices surrounding women and lower classes, the 
women anti-suffragists not only gave a deflated level of  credibility to the suffragists, but also 
refused to adopt the alternate epistemic resources offered by them. Dilke, for example, laments 
precisely the neglect of  their claims in her reply to the Appeal: 
Those who have spoken and written repeatedly on this subject for the last dozen years 
have a feeling of  hesitation and shyness at being obliged to use the same arguments 
again and again, and to bring but little fresh fuel to feed the furnace of  public opinion; 
but it is only necessary to read through the appeal with care to find that the opponents 
of  further progress have simply burnished up the old weapons and sharpened the time-
worn steel.20 
 […] These ladies take upon themselves to say the time has come to arrest all further 
progress; ignoring the fact that as the old bonds and fetters fall away from women’s 
limbs new requirements arise, new possibilities open out before them, and careers that 
but a short quarter of  a century ago would have seemed far out of  their reach now open 
before them and seem to call able and well-educated women to fill posts for which their 
training has fitted them. 
 […] Ladies of  intellect and social standing can always make their voices heard, can 
always write to the papers and magazines, can command the sympathy and attention of  
public men whenever they feel they receive less than justice. But the supporters of  
woman suffrage aspire to help those other women whose lives are spent in humble toil, 
whose work is ill paid, whose education has been defective or entirely neglected. (Dilke 
1889) 
Fawcett was also keen to point out the exclusion, alongside the consequences of  the 
continual lack of  enfranchisement of  women: 
A further consideration of  the Nineteenth Century list of  names shows that it contains a 
very large preponderance of  ladies to whom the lines of  life have fallen in pleasant 
places. There are very few among them of  the women who have had to face the battle 
of  life alone, to earn their living by daily hard work. Women of  this class generally feel 
the injustice of  their want of  representation. The weight of  taxation falls upon them just 
as if  they were men, and they do not see why representation should not go with taxation 
in their case, simply because their physical strength is less than that of  men. (Fawcett 
1889) 
The ladies in The Nineteenth Century support their case by stating that ‘all the principal 
injustices of  the law towards women have been amended by means of  the existing 
constitutional machinery.’ They may not know that the law still recognises in a mother no 
legal rights over her children during the lifetime of  her husband. […] The inequality of  
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the divorce law is another well-known instance of  the cases in which the existing 
constitutional machinery has remained placidly content with a state of  things unjust to 
women. The inequalities of  the law of  intestacy, as regards men and women, are so 
flagrant as to be almost ludicrous. Existing constitutional machinery has arranged that in 
almost every case of  intestacy the male relatives got the lion’s share. 
 […] A similar kind of  inequality is maintained as regards probate. […] It is 
unnecessary to point out that to the whole professional class this necessity of  paying 
probate on what in many cases is the widow’s own property, comes at a time when she is 
impoverished by the death of  the chief  bread-winner of  the family. No such harassing 
and exacting demands are made upon a man who loses his wife. The assumption of  the 
law is that all their joint property is his only, and he pays no probate on plate, furniture, 
&c., which they may have worked for and bought together. (“Women’s Suffrage: A 
Reply”)21 
 Fawcett and Dilke’s replies expressed feelings of  resentment and indignation at how the 
women of  the Appeal seemed to have not only unjustly misrecognized the political status of  
women but also contributed to normalizing the socio-economic injustices that were being passed 
over by the systematic underrepresentation of  women’s concerns in legislation.22 But in enacting 
testimonial injustice, the women of  the Appeal not only harmed women by prolonging 
parliamentary exclusion of  their interests, but also their capacity as knowers (Fricker 2007).23 
That is, women were excluded in limine as full participants of  the epistemic community, where 
default inclusion is meant to be constitutive of  the human condition. Further, as often happens 
in cases of  testimonial injustice, the epistemic harm is compounded in diminished self-
confidence in one’s beliefs or own epistemic capacities: Strachey observed a lamentable “phase 
of  discouragement” among suffragists in the aftermath of  the Appeal, leading eventually to the 
militancy of  the Suffragettes (Strachey 1978, 285). 
 There might be a natural concern that the testimonial injustice was itself  a product of  
other exculpatory stabilizing mechanisms constituting false consciousness. Anti-suffragist 
sentiments, after all, were widespread at the time and there was definitely some measure of  
hermeneutical injustice. That is, there was some lacuna in the collective conceptual resource: 
many women were unable to make sense of  their own social experience (e.g. the concept of  an 
independent woman). But, at best, this period of  overall moral uncertainty involved a situation 
of  a “midway” rather than “maximal” hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2016b, 167). That is, 
rather than a complete absence of  the relevant conceptual resource, suffragist groups involved 
“localised or in-group hermeneutical practices that [were] nonetheless not shared across further 
social space” (ibid., 166). But why these practices did not extend beyond suffragist social spaces 
into those of  the women of  the Appeal despite their best efforts, then, might be said to be a case 
of  contributory injustice—wherein “an epistemic agent’s willful hermeneutical ignorance [i.e. a willful 
refusal to acknowledge epistemic tools developed by marginalised groups] in maintaining and 
utilizing structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources thwarts a knower’s ability to contribute 
to shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community by compromising her 
epistemic agency” (Dotson 2012, 32, emphasis mine; cf. Pohlhaus, Jr. 2012). 
 It is common to adopt a vice-based approach in cases of  epistemic oppression (Fricker, 
2007, Medina 2013). So just as the instantiation of  the (moral-intellectual) vices of  arrogance and 
laziness may render someone’s cultural ignorance culpable, and on that basis they would be 
blameworthy for an action motivated by culturally ignorant belief, that the women of  the Appeal 
instantiated the vices of  testimonial injustice and wilful hermeneutical ignorance should suffice 
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to render their ignorance culpable (cf. Mason and Wilson 2017). But, whether conceived of  in 
vice-epistemological terms of  otherwise, one might thus conclude from these considerations that 
the women of  the Appeal were culpably ignorant on account of  testimonial injustice and wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance, and accordingly blameworthy for the publication of  the Appeal that 
hindered the suffrage movement. 
 Nevertheless, there might be lurking worries that the testimonial injustice of  the women 
of  the Appeal was a result of  a prior state of  false consciousness that was non-culpably 
constituted. Simply having a midway rather than maximal case of  hermeneutical injustice, for 
one, does not guarantee that wilful hermeneutical ignorance was the salient difference-making 
mechanism for any of  the women of  the Appeal. Still, if  all we seem to require is better evidence 
to determine which were the salient mechanisms for the women of  the Appeal, this would not 
be problematic for the position set out here, since my claim is simply that the concept of  false 
consciousness would not necessarily rule out blameworthiness. And, attending to Creighton and 
Webb’s explicit reflections about their aforementioned defection, we find that a number of  
stabilizing mechanisms sustained their beliefs—none of  which they regarded as justificatory and 
all of  which they felt remorse for. Ward, unfortunately, was sadly unmoved even in spite of  
losing the anti-suffrage cause—but with the relevant stabilizing mechanisms no less discernible. 
 Creighton’s 1906 public announcement of  her change in stance was no doubt due at least 
to her involvement with the NUWW from her presidency in 1895, as a result of  which she 
traveled broadly and “gained a wide knowledge of  all kinds of  women’s questions,” coming to 
eventually feel that “women made great progress, both in speaking and in business 
capacity” (Creighton 1994, 116). Admitting in her later memoirs that instigating the Appeal “was 
a mistake on [her] part,” and that she had “always hated everything that was concerned with 
political parties,” Creighton noted that “[w]hat was most decisive in leading [her] to change [her] 
opinion some years afterwards” was her own observation recognition that women needed the 
vote for their growing participation in “party politics” (Creighton 1994, 89).24 It was also claimed 
that “her sympathy with the industrial women in the north had led her to see the need of  the 
vote to protect their interests as wage earners” (Covert 2000, 302). 
 Yet, Fawcett’s 1889 reply (to which Creighton herself  had provided a public rejoinder a 
month right after) had already pointed out the need for suffrage to protect working class women, 
in addition to pointing out the contradiction of  the Appeal in holding that women could not 
form ‘sound judgments’ on matters of  ‘constitutional change’ and yet nonetheless organized and 
worked to elect male party candidates (e.g. the Primrose League). Creighton did not obviously 
seem to pay much attention to these points at the time of  the Appeal and recorded that she only 
realized these for herself  after. In this, then, we find that Creighton’s testimonial injustice was a 
result of  a wilful hermeneutical ignorance on her part. Rather than heeding Fawcett’s reply at the 
time and during her early tenure as the president of  the NUWW, Creighton had refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of  the suffragist hermeneutical resources as they were set forth at 
the time. In Creighton’s 1889 rejoinder, she had insistently maintained, against women’s 
participation in parliamentary decision-making, that 
If  the vote was the privilege of  the wise and the educated, many women might justly 
claim it. But it is the propelling power of  a part of  the machinery of  government which 
has always belonged to one sex. (Creighton 1889, 351) 
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 Admittedly, there is some suggestion of  the mechanism of  stereotype threat in her 
memoirs. Creighton noted that she was afraid that her recantation would take place too soon 
after her husband’s passing in 1901, such that she would seem to have been against suffrage 
because of  her husband’s influence—even though no one had said this publicly and even though 
Mandell Creighton himself  was not opposed to suffrage and had “left [her] absolutely free to 
form and express [her] own opinions” (Creighton 1994, 89). But the non-culpable mechanism of  
stereotype threat here was more relevant for the announcement of  her opinions rather than the 
maintenance of  her beliefs about suffrage per se. 
 Unlike Creighton, Webb notes in her semi-autobiographical volumes that, although she 
“delayed [her] public recantation for nearly twenty years,” she “immediately and resolutely 
withdrew from that particular controversy” upon Fawcett’s “indignant retort” to the Appeal 
(Webb 1929, 354; cf. 1975, 361). An entry in her manuscript diary, dated only a few days after 
Fawcett’s reply, records her refusal of  anti-suffragists’ requests of  her, given her social and 
intellectual standing, to respond to Fawcett’s ‘retort’ in the Nineteenth Century: 
At present I am anxious to keep out of  the controversy. I have as yet accomplished no 
work which gives me a right to speak as a representative of  the class Mrs. Fawcett would 
enfranchise: celibate women. And to be frank, I am not sure of  my ground; I am not 
certain whether the strong prejudice I have against political life and political methods 
does not influence my judgement on the question of  enfranchising women. (Webb 1929, 
354) 
Referring to this ‘strong prejudice,’ Webb later confessed that her “false step” arising out of  her 
being “anti-feminist in feeling [was] easy to explain, though impossible to justify”: 
Conservative by temperament, and anti-democratic through social environment, I had 
reacted against the narrow outlook and exasperated tone of  some of  the pioneers of  
women’s suffrage, with their continuous clamour for the Rights of  Women. Also, my dislike 
of  the current parliamentary politics of  the Tory and Whig ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ seemed a sort 
of  argument against the immersion of  women in this atmosphere. But the root of  my anti-
feminism lay in the fact that I had never myself  suffered the disabilities assumed to arise from my sex. 
(Webb 1975, 361, emphasis mine)25 
 Thus, unlike Creighton, Fawcett’s ‘indignant retort’ was what made Webb hesitate about 
the claim that the ‘principal injustices of  the law’ towards working-class women were indeed 
‘amended by means of  the existing constitutional machinery,’ as she had undersigned in the 
Appeal. Although it took some time for her “old prejudice” to eventually “evaporate” altogether, 
it is noteworthy that it was precisely the suffragists’ reactive attitude of  indignation (importantly 
thought to be constitutive of  blame) against the signatories that began Webb’s eventual epistemic 
erosion (Webb 1975, 361).26 Webb’s testimonial injustice against the women of  ‘exasperated 
tone’ at the time of  the Appeal, then, was admittedly not a matter of  wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance. However, she herself  confessed later that it had been failure of  her own procedural 
epistemic duties as an “impartial investigator of  women’s questions,” due to the intellectual 
arrogance she mentioned (ibid., 360). 
 Unfortunately, unlike Creighton and Webb, Ward passed away less than a year after she 
planned to write about her own reflections on her participation in the anti-suffrage campaigns 
(Ward 1919). But when we attend to her response to suffragist replies over the years after the 
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Appeal, we see not only a repetition of  the ‘same’ arguments she had set forth with Creighton in 
the Appeal ‘again and again,’ but an intensifying thirty-year effort to withhold the extension of  
suffrage to women—leading eventually to her deflation and defeatism when it was finally won. 
In a 1910 polemic for The Times, Ward went as far as to describe women as “necessarily 
ignorant” (Ward 1910). And in her final plea to the House of  Lords in January 1918, before the 
vote, Ward clearly heeded none of  the arguments that had won over her other contemporaries: 
Ward continued to insist that, “because of  the conditions of  their sex,” women were “the less 
educated, and more excitable, the less skilled, and less responsible elements in [Britain’s] 
population” and indeed that, with the War, “[t]he physical force argument—that physical force is 
the ultimate sanction of  the Parliamentary vote—stands stronger to-day than ever” (Ward 1918, 
48–49, 55).27 Presuming that she spoke on behalf  of  more women than the suffragists, Ward 
continued to deny not only that women were capable of  political participation but that they 
desired suffrage—in spite of  organisations such as the Primrose League or the Suffragettes. 
After the vote, she wrote defiantly to Creighton: 
Well now, thank goodness it is over […] Now the question is what the women will do 
with their vote. I can only hope that you and Mrs Fawcett are right and I am wrong. 
(Mary Ward to Louise Creighton, 14 March 1918)28 
 What is crucial in interpreting these efforts by Ward is that in her acclaimed novels, she 
nevertheless very explicitly and penetratingly explores various suffragist positions through her 
characters: Marcella (1894), which she began writing three years after the Appeal, ends with a 
balance between the ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ of  woman and her social duties; in Delia Blanchflower 
(1914), the eponymous heroine oscillates convincingly between militant and non-militant forms 
of  suffragism, even prompting an American reviewer unfamiliar with Ward’s anti-suffragism to 
mistake her for a suffragist (Sutton-Ramspeck 2000). Given that, in spite of  these aesthetic 
sympathies, Ward was still politically unsympathetic to the suffrage cause, it would thus not be 
unsafe to conclude that, like Creighton and Webb, both intellectual arrogance and wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance were the salient mechanisms lying behind the testimonial injustice that 
maintained her false consciousness—if  not before, then at least definitely in the years after the 
Appeal. 
3. False Consciousness and Blameworthiness 
Despite its historical and localized nature, the case of  the women anti-suffragists provides a 
useful heuristic for clarifying the possibility and plausibility of  blameworthiness under false 
consciousness more generally across other spheres of  oppression and where they overlap (e.g. 
ablelist, economic, gendered, racial). There are a few reasons why this case study is particularly 
amenable to this end. First, the reasons of  both anti-suffragists and suffragists, as educated and 
influential women, were well-articulated and documented in fictional and non-fictional works 
and correspondences. Second, the principled, planned, and protracted efforts of  a significant 
number of  the anti-suffragists against suffragism unfortunately echoes among a significant 
number of  women anti-feminists arguing for the political exclusion of  women on the basis of  
natural differences even today.29 Third, there is near-universal agreement today that women’s 
suffrage is morally desirable, irrespective of  the difficulties that many women might nevertheless 
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still face in exercising it. This is particularly important for us as ethicists and social philosophers, 
since normative and methodological worries about who gets to assess that a given consciousness 
is ‘false’, and how, can thus be largely kept at bay for our present inquiries into blameworthiness. 
Fourth, for better or worse, the dominant discourse of  the 1889 Appeal was largely confined to 
one to two spheres of  oppression: gender and economic. This is not to say that other spheres 
(e.g. colonialism) should be neglected in general, but only that they are not as salient for the 
particular instances of  false consciousness under consideration here.30 As such, we are provided 
a relatively tidy basis upon which social philosophers may extrapolate the present examination of  
the relation between false consciousness and blameworthiness to more overlapping, complex 
cases of  oppression (e.g. women anti-feminism in the colonies, or racism within queer 
communities in postcolonial Singapore). 
 We have seen from the case study that false consciousness does not necessarily exempt 
one from blameworthiness, where culpable mechanisms (e.g. testimonial injustice) are salient, it 
may even render one blameworthy. Given the heterogeneity of  false consciousness’ mechanisms, 
neither the rationality nor epistemic conditions are necessarily compromised, as the initial 
intuitive worry set it out to be. An agent’s responsiveness to reasons under false consciousness is 
largely limited to the particular ideology’s domain, unless it involves mechanisms such as 
preference adaptation. An agent may also be culpably ignorant under false consciousness, such as 
if  the relevant evidence-resistant attitudes are sustained by (moral-intellectual) vices where non-
culpable mechanisms are not salient in the constitution of  those vices. The use of  the concept 
of  false consciousness, therefore, is not as morally problematic as some denigrators have 
suspected—although it should nevertheless be invoked judiciously.31 
 Further, as in the case of  Webb, we have also seen that (ordinary) blame, if  understood 
at least in terms of  appropriate reactive attitudes (e.g. resentment, indignation) or in terms of  
addressing the agent and appealing to shared reasons for modifying their attitudes or behavior, 
may be itself  instrumental to the epistemic erosion of  a given false consciousness.32 In cases 
where a given false consciousness does not thematize over the reasons to which blame would 
appeal, the act presents to the relevant agent an instance of  epistemic friction. This, as Medina 
pointed out and we have seen in Webb’s awareness of  her intellectual prejudices, provides an 
opportunity for developing meta-lucidity. But, to emphasize, this is only a possibility. For, in 
other cases perhaps closer to Creighton’s (whose own rejoinder brought her national fame as an 
anti-suffragist), ordinarily blame might seem to only have a backfire effect. What the conditions 
are for erosive ordinary blame, then, is an important topic for further investigation. 
 It might be objected that, in the examples given in the case study, Creighton and Webb 
did not suffer false consciousness—at most Ward did, as evidenced from her persistent beliefs 
and behavior. However, such an objection involves unnecessarily strict criteria for what false 
consciousness consists in that is not justified by its role in the critical project. The regulatory 
concept is only meant to guide research into the contributory elements of  structures of  
oppression and point towards potential sites of  amelioration. Both Creighton and Webb fall 
squarely under the definition of  false consciousness: having evidence-resistant beliefs (epistemic 
falsity), which motivated them to reinforce a particular structure of  oppression (functional 
falsity), and in virtue of  which they formed and maintained those very beliefs (genetic falsity). To 
deny that false consciousness was present, if  it were eroded, seems to be dangerously pessimistic 
about the possibility of  emancipatory consciousness forming among the oppressed. Moreover, 
the shedding of  false consciousness for both of  them, involving a comprehensive reformation 
 of 15 23
[PREPRINT]
[PREPRINT]
of  their social self-understanding, took years before the hold that ideological mechanisms had on 
them eroded and also took great emotional tolls, such as in losing close friendships (as was the 
case between Creighton and Ward). 
 Still, the above objection might be coming from a more fundamental worry that if  social 
theorists simply obtain sufficient evidence for the mechanisms behind an agent’s psychological 
makeup and development, the concept of  false consciousness itself  would thereby be made 
explanatorily redundant for our blaming practices (apart from functioning as a heuristic for our 
evidence-gathering). Further, we seem to be moving away from a structural approach into a 
merely individualist analysis. Under the individualist analysis, it would seem that the concept of  
false consciousness loses explanatory traction since, as a structural explanation, it characterizes 
an individual as an instance of  a type existing at a structural node. What we would need, then, is 
not structural analyses—although they may be useful heuristically—but simply better epistemic 
warrant concerning the individual. Another related worry might be that wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance cannot be singled out from the nexus of  the myriad constitutive individual-level and 
structural-level mechanisms of  false consciousness as the mechanism which specifically resulted 
in the testimonial injustice of  the women of  the Appeal. So even if  there were culpable 
mechanisms, the general worry is that they work systematically alongside non-culpable ones in a 
way that renders them inextricable, insufficient conditions on their own. 
 But these worries are misplaced and conflates a number of  concerns. First, mechanisms 
such as testimonial injustice, wilful hermeneutical ignorance, or stereotype threat, are structural 
notions: structural marginalisation is constitutive of  them. Second, we need to distinguish 
between two intersecting, but very different projects here: one that concerns regulating the social 
research of  groups and another that concerns how we, as agents within a moral community, are 
to respond to fellow agents within it. In the former, we find concerns for the systematicity of  
mechanisms, culpable and non-culpable, working together as jointly sufficient conditions for 
ideology. And, as we pointed out earlier, this systematicity is only found when we analyze 
structures and their ideologies from the perspective of  the group. Not all of  these mechanisms 
are relevant in the latter project of  our blaming practices: we are only concerned with those 
mechanisms that were salient for the individual agent in question, such that they would be 
blamed or exempted accordingly. That preference adaptation might have been a salient 
mechanism for one individual under a given case of  false consciousness, does not mean that it 
was so for another. Webb, for example, in addition to noting that she did not suffer the 
‘disabilities assumed to arise from her sex’, pointed out that she was in a better socio-economic 
position than men as a “writer on economic questions” (Webb 1929, 355). To maintain otherwise 
would be to return to the aforementioned mereological problem, confusing characterisations of  
entire groups with individuals. 
 My approach to the question of  whether the women anti-suffragists were blameworthy 
differs from a number of  other approaches that have been put forward recently to the question 
of  moral blame in similar cases of  systematic social ignorance: forward-oriented responsibility and 
extended blame. These, it would seem, are promising ways to approach the question of  
responsibility in cases of  false consciousness. 
 References to Iris Marion Young’s “social connection model” of  responsibility has been 
gaining a fair bit of  traction recently among some social philosophers as a way to avoid the 
trappings of  attributing fault to an individual for structural effects (Young 2011). That is, such 
responsibility is “politically assigned rather than discovered” and “potentially grounded in factors 
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other than moral desert or causing harm” (Zheng 2018, 4; see also Fricker 2007, Medina 2013, 
Jugov and Ypi 2019). But while this might be a fruitful way forward in terms of  ameliorative task 
of  the critical project, this also notably avoids the notion of  blameworthiness entirely, and its 
attendant moral sentiments in the ordinary cases. 
 Another notion of  blame also gaining traction is grounded in expectations for agents to 
take responsibility for their actions, independent of  whether they committed a fault (see, e.g., 
Fricker 2016a, Bagnoli 2018, Aragon and Jaggar 2018, Calhoun 2019). Elinor Mason calls this 
‘extended blame,’ inasmuch as we “voluntarily extend our responsibility zone in order to secure 
the respect and trust of  others, and as a way of  showing commitment and investment in our 
relationships” (Mason 2019, 185). It would no doubt seem reasonable to expect the anti-
suffragists to take responsibility for having undersigned the Appeal. For some, there might be a 
question as to how much this would be distinct from the former, forward-oriented notion of  
responsibility (e.g. Fricker 2016a), but in either case it does not involve the full range of  moral 
sentiments relevant to ordinary blameworthiness. 
 I have argued from a careful consideration of  the women of  the Appeal that an agent 
may, in fact, be ordinarily blameworthy under false consciousness. However, to conclude, it 
should be underscored that despite this, it would be not only intellectually presumptuous but 
morally pernicious to move straightforwardly from this to the claim that we should blame them 
or that any act of  blaming in similar cases is fully justified. An act of  blame does not merely 
involve the blameworthiness of  its recipient but also other crucial aspects such as the aim of  
blame or one’s standing to enact it. The ethics of  blame requires that we take into account the 
justificatory conditions of  these other aspects: failing to do so might risk redoubling any harm 
that might have already satisfied the deterrent purpose of  blame or even reinforcing oppressive 
institutional norms, if  blame is performed publicly (cf. Snow 1994, Matthews 2014, Engen 
2020).33 Until we take all of  these into account, we cannot fully assess the justifiability of  blaming 
even in cases like the blameworthy women of  the Appeal. 
Notes 
1. False consciousness may also be said to affect oppressors, but I will only focused on the 
oppressed here. It might be said here to be the flip-side of  standpoint epistemology, where 
instead of  the conditions of  oppression facilitating the development of  emancipatory 
consciousness, they facilitate an entrenchment of  ideology. 
2. Leaving aside peripheral concerns for now like which normative and epistemological/
methodological standards of  critique would be appropriate in employing of  the concept of  
false consciousness (cf. Celikates 2017). That is, what makes a given ideology and false 
consciousness normatively problematic and how we might be able to figure out that it is so. 
3. This is illocutionarily distinct from how victim-blaming is often used as a charge against 
someone as having problematic motivations (e.g. the 2018 Irish protests over a rape trial in 
the Central Cork Court where the defence barrister noted that the claimant was “wearing a 
thong with a lace front”). 
4. Despite their disagreement over whether oppressed individuals may be blameworthy for 
acting in ways that contribute to their own oppression, most feminist philosophers are all in 
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agreement that false consciousness would exculpate simpliciter (see Superson 1993, Cudd 
2006, Hay 2013). 
5. These worries have also plagued the debate about the usefulness of  the concept of  adaptive 
preferences (cf. Terlazzo 2016). 
6. This was thought of  as even necessary by classical Marxists and many second-wave 
feminists. 
7. I adopt a broadly Strawsonian approach here, following the likes of  Gideon Rosen and 
Elinor Mason in using ‘blameworthiness in the ordinary sense’ or ‘ordinary blameworthiness’ 
to refer to (see Mason 2019). 
8. Such expansion of  the domestic also attracted criticisms from within their working-class 
ranks (see, e.g., Simkins 1909). 
9. I exclude the quality of  will condition here (see, e.g., Talbert 2013, Arpaly 2015) as the 
women of  the Appeal, as we will see, were clearly well motivated despite being morally 
mistaken. 
10. I focus here on a doxastic mode of  false consciousness, since most users largely understand 
the concept to minimally involve false beliefs. For a survey of  modes of  false consciousness, 
see M. Rosen 1996, 70–112. 
11. For criticisms of  this caricature, see, e.g., Celikates 2017. 
12. See Adorno and Horkheimer 2016, Žižek 2008, M. Rosen 1996, Cudd 2006, Haslanger 2011, 
Dotson 2014, Langton 2015, Stanley 2015, Mallon 2016, Celikates 2017, Mason and Wilson 
2017. 
13. See, for example, Marx’s comments on the proletariat, a class have nothing to lose but their 
“radical chains,” as the possibility of  German emancipation in the Introduction to the Critique of  
Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right (Marx 1844, 186). 
14. As those working on the concept of  ideology such as Jon Elster, Michel Pêcheux, and 
Michael Rosen have warned, there must be some account of  the mechanisms bridging of  
social-level properties and individual-level properties if  a theory of  ideology is to avoid 
mereological or “Münchhausen” problems (Elster 1985, Pêcheux 1994, Rosen 1996). 
15. By ‘individual-level analysis’, I do not mean an ‘individualist analysis’, wherein the structural 
context is occluded (see Garfinkel 1981, Haslanger 2016). 
16. Here, it might be useful to note the analogy of  these tasks with the regulative and 
constitutive operations of  reason for Kant, as laid out in the Third Critique (5: 401–404). 
17. Further, given Mill’s account, it seems odd to speak of  adjusting preferences if  was 
something one was brought up with. 
18. Many suffragists, however, did not necessarily share the so-called ‘liberal feminism’ of  
Wollstonecraft, which argued for the cause of  women from individual rights rather than 
social role (‘social feminism’). To note, the passing references to ‘feminism’ here is meant 
only in the broad sense of  the promotion of  equal consideration of  women’s interests. 
19. Creighton’s memoirs seems to suggest that this refers to a conference in 1912, but Fawcett’s 
letter to the editor of  The Times in 1906 mentions Creighton’s change in her views in 
October 1906, which also would be consistent with her Women in Council obituary (Millicent 
Fawcett to the editor of  The Times, 5 November 1906; “Louise Creighton Obituary,” Women 
in Council Newsletter, May 1936; cf. Creighton 1994, 172n30; Covert 2000, 368n32; Bush 2007, 
162n61). 
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20. To be fair, while Dilke was right to note that the underlying arguments had not changed 
despite the new rhetoric, she missed out on Strachey’s observation of  the new (though 
problematic) argument that women themselves did not desire the vote. 
21. Although the publication’s author was unspecified, this is commonly attributed to Fawcett by 
historians given her writing style (Nelson 2004, Bush 2007). 
22. There might be a concern that the salient brand of  oppression here would actually be class 
rather than gender, such that our concern here should not longer be a case of  the false 
consciousness of  the oppressed but rather that of  members of  the oppressing group. But as 
we observed earlier, given that social structures overlap, while gender oppression is 
foregrounded in the general notion of  suffragism, there is a need to appreciate the 
overlapping nature of  oppression and the heterogeneity of  the stabilizing mechanisms of  
false consciousness. Moreover, the undersigned of  the Appeal were, as Fawcett observed 
above, also partly composed of  women who would be directly affected by the success or 
failure of  the suffragism. For an example of  working-class anti-suffragism, see Simkins 1909. 
23. That is, whether the credibility deficit is understood non-distributively or otherwise (see 
Medina 2013, Coady 2017). 
24. She also notes that she thought the Suffragettes “needed to be steadied by responsibility” 
given their “wild performances” (Creighton 1994, 146). 
25. This appears almost verbatim Webb’s earlier volume My Apprenticeship (1929), with a 
removed note about how her anti-feminist feeling was a part-reaction to “[her] father’s 
overvaluation of  women relatively to men,” and another about “a luncheon given by an 
American lady to American suffragists (who had not given [Webb] a cigarette to sooth [her] 
distaste for the perpetual reiteration of  the rights of  women) venting this irritation by 
declaring provocatively—‘I have never met a man, however inferior, whom I do not consider 
to be my superior!’” (Webb 1929, 355). 
26. For those who think resentment or indignation are essential to blame, see, e.g., Strawson 
1962, G. Rosen 2015. 
27. Ward even reached towards bold, conspiratorial reasoning towards the end of  her plea: “I do 
not doubt its sincerity on the lips of  many good men for a moment. But the real motive power 
behind the clauses, so far as the House of  Commons, and political parties are concerned, has 
been simply political calculation” (Ward 1918, 52). 
28. Ward’s initially close friendship with Creighton was now very strained at this point. In 
November 1912, she was removed from the NUWW and in 1917, writes to Creighton, “I 
thought of  telling you something of  what your old friends have gone through in the last 
four years and how changed our life has been. But on the whole it seemed better not—
Silence is best” (Mary Ward to Louise Creighton, 12 September 1917). 
29. See Coulter 2007, Bloomfield 2016. 
30. This has been a longstanding problem with suffragism and suffragist historiography and has 
only been more recently attended to (Delap et al. 2006, Crozier-De Rosa 2018): e.g. Fawcett’s 
outrage that Maori women, following their enfranchisement, were in a superior position to 
English women (Adams 2014, 118); the hitherto overlooked contributions of  Sophia Duleep 
Singh in the suffragette movement (Anand 2015); and the New Woman novel as emerging 
from the context of  imperial South Africa (Free 2016 cf. Crozier-De Rosa 2010). 
31. Without first settling the normative and epistemological parameters, for example, the use of  
the concept may be susceptible to paternalistic misuse (Cunningham 1987). 
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32. Of  course, this does not necessarily mean that Fawcett herself  was engaging in blame in her 
retort to Webb. 
33. See Coates 2020 for a survey of  these other aspects of  the ethics of  blame in general. 
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